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NFAC #461-81

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

SP - 22/81
30 January 1981
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Multidisciplinary Branch, USSR-EE/OPA

FROM: Assistant National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs

SUBJECT: Draft IA, "The Soviet Position on Theater Nuclear Forces in Europe"

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1. I have fundamental disagreements with the 22 January draft of [] paper. I am returning my copy of the draft which contains several marginal notes and suggestions for changes in the text, although my changes, even if accepted, would not remedy all the problems I find with the paper. []

2. It may be that most of my problems stem from not knowing which statements, interpretations and evaluations are those of the authors and which are intended to be descriptions of the Soviets' position. A summary of my objections to passages which seemed to be the author's views and findings follows:

--Depictions of Soviet force deployments as reactions to threats to the USSR posed by NATO forces in Europe.

--Presentation of a two-point rationalization (whether the author's or the Soviets' notwithstanding) of Soviet preponderance of peripheral attack forces--to offset NATO tactical nuclear superiority, to counter NATO FBS without elaboration of the inconsistency in the rationale as presented.

--Evaluations of the relationship in tactical and theater nuclear forces of the two sides without reference to the disparity between NATO and Warsaw Pact conventional forces.

--Apparent acceptance by the author of the militarily unsupportable notion that every NATO air base from which aircraft could be launched capable of striking the USSR represents a nuclear threat to the Soviet Union.

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--In reflecting on the targeting requirements to attack mobile systems--
deployed SS-20, GLCMs and Pershing II--an apparent assumption that both sides
would know the location of the launchers and thus be able to target them
with single warheads.

--Key judgments which are ambiguous.

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3. My personal view is that as a NATO military requirement, there is only
a weak case for LRTNF deployments, but using the Soviets rationale, NATO has a
strong case. I believe this would be demonstrated if we found measures by
which to depict the relationship between NATO and Warsaw Pact LRTNF in combination
with relationships between tactical and intercontinental nuclear forces. However,
perceptions are important and LRTNF deployments would obviously make Europeans
and some in the US feel better about NATO's security. On the other hand, LRTNF
deployments by NATO could be counterproductive to Western security if the asking
price includes lesser efforts in modernizing NATO's conventional forces. For
[redacted] paper to be most useful, I believe it should be organized to
describe the Soviet's position on theater nuclear forces in Europe--point by
point--without interjecting commentary by the author. The reader should be
able readily to distinguish between such descriptions of Soviet positions and
descriptions of developments in forces, motives and strategy of the two sides
which are evaluations attributable to the author.

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